Institute of Lobbying: the Specifics of Functioning, the Main Development Trends

Introduction. The article is devoted to the study of the institute of lobbying as an institutionalized mechanism of influence on political decision-making in modern democracies. Democracy is understood here as a political system that meets the criteria of competitive elections, separation of powers, and protection of human rights. Lobbying is interpreted as targeted interaction between business structures, public authorities and civil society aimed at representing interests and developing legislative initiatives in the public sphere. The paper provides a comparative legal and content analysis of the main models of lobbying activities (registry, consulting, hybrid and digital), examines legal regulation (laws of the USA, EU, Canada and regulatory gaps in the Russian Federation) and assesses the impact of lobbying on the stages of public policy development. Special attention is paid to a comparative analysis of practices in the United States, the European Union, and Russia, which revealed common principles of institutionalization and significant differences in transparency, accountability, and sanctions mechanisms.
Materials and methods. This study uses a set of methods, including a comprehensive literature review, case-by-case analysis, comparative analysis, study of legal norms, and statistical analysis. Initially, a systematic review of scientific publications, monographs and legislative acts on lobbying in Russia and foreign countries (USA, EU, Canada, Brazil, India) was conducted, which allowed to identify key conceptual approaches and existing gaps in the research. Further, based on reports on the Lobbying Disclosure Act (USA, 1995-2023), the EU Transparency Register and the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying (Canada), specific examples of institutionalized lobbying were analyzed to understand the mechanisms of registration, reporting and control. A comparative analysis of various lobbying systems was carried out according to the criteria of transparency, formalization, administrative costs and flexibility, as well as an assessment of their effectiveness in influencing the process of public policy formation. To determine the scope and limitations of regulatory regulation, a detailed analysis of existing laws and regulations was performed, including the identification of the lack of a clear definition, participants and sanctions in Russian legislation. The statistical analysis of lobbying costs and their distribution by sector was based on open data from registers and annual reports of lobbying organizations, which made it possible to visualize the cost structure.
Results of the study. Institutionalized lobbying is one of the key mechanisms of influence on the political decision-making process in modern democratic states. Professional lobbyists and specialized lobbying organizations influence the formation of the state agenda in a wide range of areas, from economic, trade, and economic to environmental and social policy. An analysis of open registry data shows that lobbying costs in the United States are continuously increasing, reaching USD 4.5 billion in 2023 (U.S. Senate, 2024), which indicates the increasing weight of corporate interests in the legislative process. Transparency of registration procedures and regular reporting, characteristic of the registry models of the USA and the EU, plays a critical role in ensuring a balance between public interests and the interests of individual groups. In countries with well-established legal frameworks (strict disclosure requirements, sanctions for reporting violations), lobbying demonstrates a higher level of legitimacy and public trust. At the same time, underestimating the role of control and insufficient mechanisms of sanctions can lead to excessive influence of narrow groups and the creation of corruption risks. The effectiveness of institutionalized lobbying is determined by the resources of the participants and the quality of legal regulation, transparency of processes and a strict system of responsibility for violations of norms.
Discussion and conclusion. The modern practice of institutionalized lobbying demonstrates its dual nature: on the one hand, lobbying contributes to the democratic process by providing legislators with expert data from business, science, and public organizations, and on the other, in the absence of a clear legal framework and control mechanisms, it can become a source of political corruption and opaque influence. In transitional and mature democracies, it is important to develop a comprehensive regulatory approach that includes mandatory registration of participants, disclosure of financial flows, and sanctions for reporting violations. Such a system provides a balance between legitimate representation of interests and avoiding the dominance of narrow groups. Lobbying, being an integral element of public policy, should be integrated into a unified legal architecture supported by accountability and monitoring mechanisms. Of particular relevance is the further study of lobbying practices in emerging democracies, where the lack of a tradition of transparency exacerbates the risks of corrupt influence and overcoming institutional barriers to effective representation of civil and commercial interests.

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