THE CONCEPT OF JUDGE'S IMPARTIALITY IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE: BASIC CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

Introduction. The article presents a study of the legal category of "impartiality" of a judge in the administration of justice. Until recently, the concept of impartiality was identified exclusively with reason (rationality), where there was no place for the study of emotions. There is a point of view in legal positivism that the term "impartiality" is a state of consciousness in which the possibility of expressing emotions is excluded. However in recent decades Western scientific publications have revived interest in the knowledge of emotions in law which bypasses the consideration of the emotional theory of ethical phenomena by L. I. Petrazhitsky. In this regard the author of the article, first, conducted a study of the concept of impartiality of a judge based on the analysis of international documents and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Secondly, the author reviewed the Russian legislation which regulates the features of the term "impartiality" in the administration of justice. Third, the term "impartiality" was analyzed through the prism of the main concepts of emotions in law. Materials and methods. The methodological basis of the study is characterized by the following methods: 1) general (dialectics); 2) general scientific (analysis, synthesis, system and functional approaches); 3) private scientific (formal-legal and comparative-legal); 4) problem-theoretical reconstruction. Results of the study. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the author of the article not only analyzed the formal features of the term "impartiality" based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights but also studied the nature of impartiality through the prism of modern approaches to emotions in law and classified them. As a result of the study, the following conclusions are made, which, among other things, are of practical importance: 1) impartiality in making the justice can be objective and subjective; 2) the basis for impartial decision-making by a judge can be: a) exclusively, the reason (formal-rationalistic approach);b) the reason and emotions with the dominance of the former and the negative consequences of the latter for the process of making a legal decision (irrational approach); c) reason and emotions, which are not opposed to each other, but interact with each other as equivalent components in the formation of a judicial decision (cognitive approach); d) imperative and attributive emotions, which are the source of law (ethical and legal approach). Discussion and conclusion. It is proved that the impartiality of the judge's personality is formed not only by intellectual, moral, and volitional spheres, but also by emotional ones, where the latter includes conscientiousness and receptivity. It is precisely the judges' behavior, their decision-making, that determines their beliefs based on conscience, which is the source of true law, called intuitive law.

administration of justice, impartiality, law, reason, judge, emotions, rationality, legal consciousness

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