Humankind faces two fundamental problems today - its excessive numerical growth and the deterioration of the environment, and the former problem aggravates the latter.

In the 1960s the great comparativist John Henry Merryman (1920-2015) wrote three articles published in the Stanford Law Review on the “Italian style», seeking to identify specific characteristics in Italian contemporary doctrine, interpretation and law within the civil law tradition (§ 1). Merryman considered the Italian legal system to be an “archetype”, more “typical” in some respects than the French and German systems. Merryman wrote that “Italy is perhaps the only one of the major civil law nations to have received and rationalized the two principal, and quite different, influences on European law in the nineteenth century: the French style of codification and the German style of scholarship” (§ 2).My work, following some of Merryman’s suggestions regarding the concept of a legal tradition and comparative legal history, aims to shed new light on Italian legal culture between the nineteenth and the twentieth century. The article seeks to identify in particular the “anthropological-cultural” dimension of the Italian jurist’s experience. For this purpose I propose a new interpretative concept, namely, the “eclectic canon” (§ 3). It has to do with the general category of «eclecticism» but it is something different and more than this. It is an approach that can help us to appreciate the complexity of Italian legal culture by transcending the oft-told “tale” in two chapters (French influence first (1800-1870), German influence subsequently: 1870-1920). This scheme remains useful but it is only a part of the story, so we need to subsume it within a more complex plot.The eclectic canon has a fundamental core, based on two founding “fathers”. I refer to Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and Giandomenico Romagnosi (1761-1835), philosophers, jurists and historians of great merit and distinction. We are concerned here with a cultural foundation pre-existing the so-called Schools (Exegèse, Historische Schule, Philosophical or Benthamit School…). The eclectic canon is not a school but rather a deep stratum. It does not produce a system or a legal order. It deals above all with the habitus, or the ways of being a jurist.The adjective “eclectic” underlines the structure of the canon, that is the aim to reconcile different orientations. The concept of stratum recalls a historical approach widely used and developed in anthropological and comparative law studies. The core of the eclectic canon is the “Historical- philosophical-dogmatic” approach. History, Philosophy and dogmatics taken alone are not sufficient to found a sound legal education and a good practice as a jurist. Only a balanced mixture could provide a correct solution. Italian style entails the tempering of different stances. In effect, another consequence of the eclectic canon - constantly noted by most Italian jurists - would be that of the combination of theory and practice in the actual design of legal culture (§ 4).

The article concentrates attention on the crisis of traditional theories of the state, probably never fully translated into reality, and on the emerging need of a new, more adequate constitutional semantics. After having considered, on the basis of a general system’s theory approach , the legal system as the most abstract instrument that, thanks to adjustable borders, “constitutes” and “regulates” social games able to combine stabilisation, selection and variation of legal norms, the article draws critical attention to the borders of territory, sovereignty and people, traditionally considered as the main pillars of the state. Finally the article examines the present situation of the European Union, which offers a significant example of the difficulties met by nation states whenever they try to fulfil some of their traditional tasks within the framework of a supra-national entity.

Comparatists are evidently in no position to see and investigate always the entire picture: even though one of the founders of comparative law stated that the student of problems of law must encompass the law of the whole world, past and present, and everything that affects the law, from geography, climate and race to developments and events shaping the course of a country’s history passing through religion and ethics, the ambition and creativity of individuals, the interests of groups, parties and classes, we cannot actually expect that she can master such an overwhelming mass of information.Comparatists, though, should be trained with the aim of observing legal documents, i.e. constitutions, through a syncretic intellectual equipment - law is the destination but, to get there, more than law is required. Then, CCL should still be included in the family of legal scholarships, but comparatists could not restrain themselves to learn law only. This assumption implies that comparatists should be trained to develop, nurture, and enhance this broader latitude of analysis and the necessary range of cultural sensitivities: to understand constitutions as culture, law may be not sufficient and many times we already know it is not. Paraphrasing von Clausewitz’s well known aphorism, CCL is a continuation of law by (also) other means.

If we consider the role the case law has played in recent years, we, as jurists of the “continent”, are impressed by the prominence it has assumed in the production of law (1). This new case law, in fact, seems to operate in a context different to the conventional judge / statute law relationship observed in the so-called civil law legal system (2). This novel framework merits exploration and investigation.Here, the autonomy of law emerges as a significant theoretical issue to be considered and understood against the background of historical experience. Using the lemma “autonomy of the law”, I want to examine the scope of legal production, in which the rules are the result of self-organization practices or of institutional dynamics (for example those connected with the Judiciary), without the involvement or mobilisation of political power.

This essay aims at reflecting on the persistent relevance of the traditional distinction between ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ law as an essential feature of the English legal tradition, in order to better understand the current discussion concerning the enactment of a written Constitution for the United Kingdom, after the wide public consultation launched in 2014 by House of Commons. Three main aspects are considered: the difference between the idea of Rule of law and the continental idea of Staatsrecht, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, the relationship between statute law and case law. It will be argued that even if a written constitution should ever see the light in the United Kingdom, it will presumably have a very particular status. A peculiarly ‘British’ one.

The paper considers aspects related to the evolution of EU social policy for the protection of senior people in urban areas. To begin, it offers an overview of the main policies enacted at an International and European level with the aim of protecting seniors’ rights and empowering their participation in social and economic life. One main finding of the analysis is that the need of EU institutions to tackle the demographic change of European people and turn the phenomenon of ageing into a resource for the society heavily depends on the urban social policies that the EU shall implement in the future. The paper concludes that the challenges inherent the creation of ageing-friendly and green cities can be achieved only giving senior people freedoms in a public sphere of active democratic participation.Albeit its unitary conception, Erik Longo drafted Sections 1, 4, and 5 while Laura Vagni drafted the other Sections.

The legislative branch of power, represented by the Parliament is one of the core elements of the system of separation of power in a developed democratic state and an effective part of the “checks and balances” mechanism. In this article the author reviews basics of the constitutional status of the Federal Assembly - the Parliament of the Russian Federation, defines main functions and methods of their implementation. The legislative process is under review as well, since it is one of the core functions of a modern parliament and its stages and participants are defined. The author reviews one of the youngest institutions of Constitutional law as well, which is typical for mixed types of republics - the parliamentary control.

The paper recalls the process which led to the adoption of the new european Data Protection Regulation, in the context of the rapid development of the Information and Communication Technologies and the amazing increase of data flows (Big data). Data Protection and Privacy Protection could be seen as limits to the development of technologies. On the other hand, the rapid evolution of Smart cities and ICTs brings new risks for the protection of fundamental rights. The new european Regulationn. 2016/679 could be insufficient to protect privacy rights in the age of Big data. Maybe some new instrument is necessary to protect personal data and, consequently, privacy. The paper proposes the concept of «Privacy by Research», intended as a new privacy-friendly method of design for devices, databases and apps.Albeit its unitary conception, Simone Calzolaio drafted Sections 1, 2, 3 while Valentina Pagnanelli drafted Sections 4 and 5.

The essay analyzes the mechanisms adopted by the Italian regions in order to implement EU law. Indeed, under the Italian Constitution the regions must contribute to the implementation of EU law. The regional rules (regional charters, laws and administrative acts) are used to adapt the national provisions to the different territorial realities.

The present paper aims at studying the international rules which have to be applied for the purposes of determining whether a certain conduct taken in the context of a UN-led multinational operation must be attributed to troop-contributing states or to the United Nations. It will also consider whether, and under what circumstances, the same conduct may be attributed to both subjects. The analysis will mainly rely on the interpretation of the rules of attribution set forth in the ILC’s Articles on the responsibility of states, adopted in 2001, and in the Articles on the responsibility of international organizations adopted in 2011. In this regard, it is submitted that, when applying the criterion of attribution set forth in Article 7 of the 2011 Articles to UN peacekeeping forces, importance must be attached in the first place to the manner in which the transfer of powers was formally arranged between the organization and the troop-contributing state.

The aim of this contribution is to observe the historical origin of the Welfare State crisis. Social law and national insurance systems have worked as a strategy to manage poverty and social exclusion. Jurists consider the new social laws as transient political measures so they do not extend them by means of interpretation. The policies put in place to combat poverty show that the collaboration between State and society was not intended to be a space to develop autonomy. Social bonds and solidarity do not depend solely on the State action, but also owe much to the spontaneous initiative of some members of society. At the origins, solidarity was realized through mutual aid societies. They represent an example of relationship between State and society which is alternative to the individualistic one, a «model» that combines the centrality of the individual with the necessary relational dimension of individual well-being.